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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA M. HOVE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 16850

JOHNS. Mc.MASTER, D.D.S., and
HIGHLAND DENTAL CLINIC, INC.,
a professional corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
As stated in the Appellant's Brief this is an action
for damages resulting from an alleged act of dental malpractice.

The only issue before the Court is whether the Appel-

lant's claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations contained
in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, §78-14-4, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended) .
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
Again as stated in the Appellant's Brief this action
was bifurcated and the only issue tried by the Court below
was whether or not the Appellant failed to commence her action
against the Resdpondents within two years from the date on
which she knew, or should have known, that she had sustained
an injury and that said injury was caused by the Respondent,
John S. McMaster, D.D.S.

The Court resolved this issue of

fact in favor of the Respondents, that is, that Appellant did
-

1 -
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fail to commence her action against the Respondents within two
years from the date on which she knew, or should have known,
that she had sustained an injury and, based on that finding,
held that the plaintiff's action was barred by the foregoing
Statute of Limitations.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to affirm the Findings of the Court
in the trial below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in the Appellant's
Brief, as to the chronology of the event is correct.

However,

the statement simply glosses over or fails to point out that
evidence in the record which sustains the Findings of the
Trial Court.

It was agreed at the outset of the trial below,

for the purposes of that trial, that the injury of which the
Appellant complained occurred during the course of dental
treatment administered by Dr. McMaster on February 27, 1974
(Tr. 6-10), and that the Appellant had two years from the date
she knew, or should have known, of the injury in which to
file her action.

All of the evidence was therefore directed

toward the issue of when the Appellant knew, or should have
known, that she had suffered a legal injury.
The Appellant is a resident of Cleveland, Ohio, where
she moved after the graduation of her husband from law school
at the University of Utah (Tr. 21).

She was born in Albany,

New York, and attended high school in Albany.

After high

school she attended several schools, eventually receiving a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a degree in nursing at Albany Memorial Hospital in Albany,
New York, which qualified her as a registered nurse.

From

there she attended Boston University where she received a
Bachelor of Science in Nursing Science (Tr.. 14).

While

attending the University she worked at the Student Health
Clinic and the U.S. Public Service Hospital in Boston

(T~.

15),

and has since spent several months working in hospitals as
a nurse.

As a nurse she is qualified to make injections of

drugs into the human body (Tr. 17), and has been taught how to
make injections so as not to interfere with a nerve (Tr. 18).
More specifically she has been taught the consequences of making
an injection directly into a nerve (Tr. 18), one of which
is that the person who was receiving the injection would suffer
a shocking sensation which she described as "more in the sense
of hitting your elbow, your funny bone and getting a shocking
sensation"

(Tr. 19) .

On February 27, 1974, the Appellant went to see Dr.
McMaster, a dentist, for the purpose of having a cavity filled.
She was given two injections.

At the time of the second in-

jection the Appellant testified that she recalled the doctor
pushing his needle in and it hit something hard;
"And then he kept pushing it and
then it seemed to give way and hit
something soft and when it did I
got this shock in my face and I
said, awe, awe, awe, which is about
all I could say with my mouth open".
(Tr. 24).
When asked to equate her experience as a nurse and
the shock suffered by patients when an injection is made into
- 3 -
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a nerve as to whether that was the kind of shock she felt she
answered, "I would say it would be fair to say, a similar
type".

(Tr. 24).

She described the sensation as feeling the

medication being injected, it felt as if it traveled toward
her nose and then went under her eye.

She had a slight burn-

ing sensation and then it all went numb.

(Tr. 25).

It took her a long time to get the sensation in
her face back (Tr. 27).

When it did come back she was left

with the sensation of feeling that her face and nose were
plugged up.

She had tingling off and on for the next six

months, had a sense of pressure behind the right eye, and had
half a dozen blood shot eyes over the same period (Tr. 28).
She stated she knew something was wrong, something felt funny.
She did not attribute it specifically to that injection but
she did relate it specifically to the visit she had with
Dr. McMaster on February 27, 1974, which is when she stated
her problem seemed to start.

(Tr. 29).

The Appellant then states that her condition calmed
down for a while and then after a few months it would flare
up again (Tr. 30).

In February of 1975, she stated, referring

to the periods of time when her symptoms would flare up,
Well, as I said, I kept having them on
and off so I thought something wasn't
right and Dr. McMaster said he couldn't
find anything and I suggested, well, I
think I ought to go see a neurologist
and he said, yes, that might not be a
bad idea and he said, do you want me to
recommend one and I said that I had one
in mind (Tr. 30).
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The doctor she selected was a Dr. Wayne Hebertson,
whom she saw on February 24, 1975.

When asked if she had a

discussion with Dr. Hebertson as to whether the injection
caused her problem she testified, "I may have asked him if
it did because I was - what I was looking for is why I was
having the problem and treatment."(Tr. 31).
Dr. Hebertson's deposition was published during the
course of trial.

He testified that he is a board certified

neurologist (Tr. 69).
Appellant gave Dr. Hebertson a history of the dental
procedure and the numbness which gradually went away.

He

testified that about two weeks prior to his examination the
Appellant noted an onset of pain above the right cheek bone,
tingling below the right eye, her right ear felt plugged and
her right eye was tired.

It was the doctor's opinion that the

complaints which he observed in Mrs. Hove could certainly
reflect some involvement of the facial nerves or other facial
structures such as a jaw joint (Tr. 70).

He discussed his

diagnostic impressions with her which were:
"That she could have local infection of the facial nerves such as
one might get with shingles. Also
whether it might represent some complication of her prior dental injections
and/or her dental surgery. Whether
she may have some arthritic condition
in the jaw joints and/or some other
dental source of pain in her mouth
and j aw. " (Tr. 71) .
Thereafter, she continued to visit various doctors
and dentists, each time relating the history of the injection
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and soliciting their opinions as to whether or not that was
causing her problem. Dr. Wayne Provost, a dentist, testified
he saw her in September of 1975, and at that time she asked
him about the burning sensation and pain she had on the right
side of her face and if it could be due to a dental injection.
The doctor at that time told her he thought it was unlikely
(Tr. 58) .
She saw a Glen K. Lund, M.D., a ear, nose and throat
specialist, to whom she related that she had pain in her face
on the right side and some nasal obstruction on the same side
and that she dated this back to the time when she had an injection for a dental procedure.

The doctor felt she had a

nasal obstruction on the right side but could not see the
source of pain.

He did think she might have atypical facial

neuralgia which might be due to remote ·injection.

It does

not appear that he discussed it with her but did recommend
that she see a neurologist (Tr. 63-64).

The Appellant did

see a neurologist, Dr. Leonard Jarcho, who practices at the
University of Utah Medical Center.

The Appellant gave him a

history of a burning sensation on the right side of her face
and said that in May 1974, she had both her wisdom teeth
removed and right last molar filled, during which an injection
hit a nerve near the nose and at that time she had shooting
pain in her right upper jaw almost back on the ear with numbness to the angle of the mouth and up to the skull (Tr. 73).
The doctor thought it unlikely that her complaint of a burning sensation was an organic complaint.

He found no evidence
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of any injury to the nerve and no connection between the
injection which she described in her history and her complaints
when he examined her on April 26, 1977 (Tr. 74).
The Appellant gave the same history to Dr. John
Gardner in Cleveland, Ohio.

Dr. Gardner's impression was that

the plaintiff had atypical facial pain.

He reported, "Seemingly

its onset can be dated to needle trauma to what sounds like
the maxillary nerve on the right side at the time of injection."
ARGUMENT
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IN
THE CASE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDINGS
THAT THE ACTION OF THE CLAIMANT WAS
NOT COMMENCED WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE
DATE

ON WHICH SHE KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE

KNOWN THAT SHE SUFFERED A LEGAL INJURY.
The issue in this case is not whether or not this
Court may believe that the Appellant knew or should have known
that she had a legal injury at least two years and ten months
before she filed her notice of intent to sue, but whether the
Trial Court could have so found on the basis of the evidence.
In the case cited by the Appellant, in his brief,
Hardy v. Hendrickson, this Court held that the evidence
supported the Trial Court's reformation of a joint tenancy
agreement, which reformation was based on findings of the Trial
Court that the joint checking account was opened for the sole
purpose of allowing a daughter

to handle the business affairs

of her incapacitated mother, without knowledge of the mother,

- Funding
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and that the daughter during her lifetime made no claim of
ownership by reason of joint tenancy.

This Court held:

"On appeal the evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to
sustain the lower court, and the
findings will not be· disturbed
unless they are clearly against
the weight of the evidence or it
manifestly appears that the court
misapplied the law to the established
facts."
It should not be assumed from what has been set out
in the Statement of Facts that Dr. John S. McMaster was
guilty of malpractice and,except for the defense of the Statute
of Limitations, the Appellant has a legal claim against the
Respondents.

Even the medical report of Dr. John Gardner, on

which she apparently basis her claim, does not support this
conclusion.
Section 78-12-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"In any action against a physician
and surgeon, dentist • . • for professional negligence or for rendering
professional services without consent,
if the responsive pleading of the defendant pleads the action is barred by
the statute of limitations, and if
either party so moves the court, the
issue raised thereby may be tried separately
and before any other issues in the case
are tried.
If the issue raised by the
defense of the statute of limitations
is finally determined in favor of the
plaintiff, the remaining issue shall
then be tried."
The Respondents simply elected to try the issue of
whether or not the Appellant's action was barred by the Statute
of Limitations before the issue of whether or not the Respondents
were guilty of any act of malpractice was tried.
- 8 provided
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Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
provides:
"No malpractice action against a
health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two
years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever
first occurs, but not to exceed four
years after the date of the alleged
act, omission, neglect, or occurrence
II

This Court in the case of Foil v. Ballinger, 601,
P.2d 144, held that the statute begins to run when the injured
person knows, or should know that he has suffered a legal injury.
Therefore, it was assumed for purposes of the trial of this
part of the case that the Respondents were guilty of malpractice,
that is to say that the Appellant did suffer a legal injury,
and the question was when did, or should the Appellant have
discovered that injury.

If we take one extreme, we could say

the Appellant should have discovered the injury the moment
the injection was made.

If we take the other extreme, which

seems to be the position taken by the Appellant's counsel
in this case, we would say the action does not start to run
until the person who feels that he has sustained a legal injury
finds a witness who he believes will come into court and
testify in his favor.

Such a holding would render the two

year statute meaningless because a person who felt he had
sustained a legal injury could always wait two, three or up
to four years before contacting an attorney or making any
effort to substantiate his claims.

- 9 -
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The Appellant in this case was a registered nurse who
had gone beyond that stage and taken out a Bachelor of Science
Degree in Nursing Science.

She had worked in hospitals and

other medical care facilities.

She was trained in the proper

method of making an injection and knew what might be expected
to occur if an injection was made in such a manner as to injure
a nerve.

She describes the complaints which she had following

the injection on February 24, 1974, as being similar to that
which she would expect as a nurse if she had made an injection
which damaged the nerve.

It is submitted that it can there-

fore be argued that she knew at the time the injection was
made, assuming it was made improperly, that she had suffered
a legal injury.
Thereafter, for six months, the plaintiff had a
burning and tingling sensation in her face, suffered a half
a dozen or more blood shot eyes and had a plugged up feeling
in her nose and ears.

It is submitted that any reasonable

individual who has ever been to a dentist and had an injection
would know that the reaction which the plaintiff had was not
that which might reasonably be expected from an injection and
that therefore the injection was made in an improper manner.
However, we need not confine ourselves to what the
plaintiff should have reasonably inferred by reason of her
own knowledge and experience.

One year after having received

the injection she, on her own notion, went to a doctor of her
own selection, Dr. Wayne Hebertson, who told her that her
complaints, "might represent some complication of her prior
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dental injections and/or her dental surgery."

The doctor also

told her that he thought the condition should be continued
under observation in hopes that it might alleviate spontaneously
and to contact him further if she had any persistence of her
difficulty.

She choose not to do so.

Assuming that the Respondents were guilty of malpractice
in this case, we need not ask ourselves the question as to
when the Appellant should have known that she sustained a
legal injury.
outset.

She was apparently convinced of this from the

This is evidenced by the fact that every time she

went to a doctor for dental treatment or any other purpose,
one of the first questions that she always asked was whether
or not her complaints could be related to an injection made
in February of 1974.
It is therefore submitted that the Statute of Limitations in this case began to run when the plaintiff first formed
this conclusion which might be as early as the date of the
injection itself, when she had the unusual reaction to the
injection which she described as being similar to that sustained by a patient when an injection is made into a nerve.
It surely was formed during the six months following the
injection when she had the complications she claims following
the injection such as the blood shot eye, tingling in her
face and things of that nature.

At the very latest the con-

clusion was formed when she went to Dr. Hebertson and related
the history of the dental procedures and was informed by the
doctor that her problem might represent some complication
- 11 -
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of her prior dental injections and/or dental surgery.
If we give the Appellant the benefit of the doubt,
the statute did not begin to run until the date she saw the
doctor on February 24, 1975. This was two years and ten months
,.·

prior to the time the notice of intent to commence an action
was served on December 29, 1977, and three years before the
Complaint was filed on February 22, 1978 (Tr. 53).
It may be argued that the plaintiff should be given
more time to develop testimony to substantiate her claims.

The

burden placed on the Appellant in this case is no different
than the burden placed on the plaintiff in other civil actions.
The person who believes he has been

libele~

slandered or

assualted, has only one year in which to determine to bring
a lawsuit against the offender.

In the case of wrongful death

the plaintiff has two years, the same period of time as here,
to do so.
The attorney for the Appellant argues that the
findings of the Trial Court is not supported by the evidence.
He contradicts himself by the following admission found on page
ten of his argument:

"The evidence here is clear while Hove

knew that she had a "problem" from the moment of the injection,
for three and a half years thereafter she could obtain

absolute~

no diagnosis that this "problem" was caused by negligence in
that injection."
The Appellant attempts to draw an analogy between
the cases of Foil v. Ballinger and this case.

It appears

from reading the case of Foil v. Ballinger that that case is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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an appeal from a summary judgment which was based on the allegations of the complaint rather than on the evidence produced
at a trial and the case was remanded for a determination as to
when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged
negligence giving rise to her injuries.

The medical problem

in Foil v. Ballinger concerned the administration of a permanent
subarachnoid phenol block and was much more complicated than
the medical problem in this case.

Even so, the Court held that

the Statute of Limitations would begin to run when the plaintiff
in that case had an indication from a report to the State Industrial Commission that her rectal and bladder problem of
which she complained may have been caused by the administration
of a subarachnoid phenol block.
In the case of Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199
436 P.2d 435,

it does not appear that the plaintiff had any

indication that a surgical needle had been left in his body
during a surgical operation.

Again this case was decided on

a motion for summary judgment and again the Court held:
"However, upon the record, it is
our judgment that the question of
whether or not the plaintiff commenced his action within four years
after he knew, or should have known,
of the presence of the surgical needle
in his bodv is an issue to be resolved
by the trier of the facts."
In this case if we start with the assumption that the
defendants were guilty of malpractice, it is clear the Appellant, Hove, as stated in Appellant's Brief, knew that she
had a"problem" from the moment of the injection and spent
- 13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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three and a half years thereafter in trying to find a doctor
who would so testify. Even if we assume that the Appellant
did not know of the problem at the time of the injection, she
knew as much after she had seen Dr. Hebertson one year after
the injection, as she learned when she saw Dr. Gardner on
October 21, 1977,

when Dr. Hebertson discussed with her whether

her problem might represent some complication of her prior
dental surgery, injections or dental surgery which she chose
not to follow up on.
CONCLUSION
In this case we have an Appellant with a Bachelor of
Science Degree in Nursing Science and with special knowledge
as to what complaints or symptoms might be expected from an
injection in an improper manner into or near a nerve.

If we

believe the Appellant, on February 27, 1974, she received such
an injection from the Respondent, John

s.

McMaster, and ex-

perienced the reaction which she testified might be expected
under those circumstances.

At that point, if we believe the

Appellant, she knew she had a problem.

She continued to

experience difficulty for the next six months, at which time
she claims that it subsided and then flared up for a period
of time before she saw Dr. Hebertson, who informed her that
her problem might be due to complications of her prior dental
injections and/or dental surgery.

Thereafter, the Appellant

continued to see various doctors for the treatment of her
various problems but in each instance inquired of them as to
whether or not her problems related to an injection on February
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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27, 1974, which was made in a negligent manner, she was aware
of this fact, if not at the time of the injection, at least
within a year after the injection.

Nevertheless, Appellant

did not commence her lawsuit by the filing of a notice of intent
to sue until December 29, 1977, over three years after the
incident.

On the basis of that evidence, the Trial Court found

that the Appellant knew, or had reason to know, that she had
suffered a legal injury over two years prior to the time that
she commenced her action.

Having so found, the Court dismissed

her complaint under §78-14-4, which provides that,
"No malpractice action may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs."
Though each of us may take a different view of the
evidence, it does not appear that the findings of the Court
are against the weight of the evidence or that the Court below
misapplied the law to the established fact.
most favorably

In fact, viewed

the evidence clearly supports the findings of

the lower court.
Some of us may feel that the period of time prescribed
by the statute is too short and that it imposes too great a
burden upon plaintiff. However, that is for the Legislature
to determine and should not be determined by judicial fiat or
by failing to enforce the statute.

The Statute of Limitations

in a medical malpractice case imposes no greater burden upon
plaintiffs than do the Statutes of Limitations for many other
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causes of action.

In the field of medical malpractice the

Legislature has simply determined that matters should be
put to rest in a shorter period of time than in many other
areas such as the statute applying to written contracts.

--

It is submitted that the Findings of the Trial
Court should be affirmed.
DATED this

~day

of

~·

1980.

Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & NELSON

~~

AttorneysfurefndailtS=Respondents
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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I, Don J. Hanson, attorney for the Respondents in
the above-entitled action, hereby certify that on the'1.J_ciA
day of May 1980, I served the attached Respondents' Brief
upon Jonn T. Anderson, attorney for the Appellant, by
depositing two copies thereof in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
John T. Anderson
ROW & FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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